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Structural Variables 
Endre Bjørndal, Mette Bjørndal 
SNF / NHH 
Ana Camanho 
University of Porto 
Summary 
In this report, referred to as Report 2, we investigate NVE’s suggestions for relative 
weight restrictions on the structural and size dependent output variables, i.e. VR1-VR8 in 
NVE (2008). In the present DEA model these are variables with a large degree of slack, 
i.e. many companies have zero shadow prices on the variables, indicating some 
inefficiency that is not captured by the DEA analyses. We show that the two-sidedness of 
the weight restrictions and the large number of them, involving a large share of the output 
variables, may have unintended effects on the efficiency scores, and that the effects on 
the efficiency scores in many cases are determined almost completely by the exact limits 
of the relative weight restrictions. The latter implies that the specification of the limits is 
very important. 
However, many of the output variables in the present DEA models are endogenous 
variables, in fact they are often input variables used to proxy or represent cost drivers on 
which there is not sufficient data, or that otherwise cannot be well represented by 
exogenous output variables. NVE (2008) uses to a great extent cost data, either 
annualized cost or the relationship between investment expenses, as a basis for 
determining relative weight restrictions. Yet, it is clear that since the output factors in 
question represent “more than themselves” it may be extremely difficult to settle on 
meaningful bounds on relative shadow prices. In order to illustrate this point, we also 
discuss the implicit assumptions about substitutability between output variables that 
relative weight restrictions represent. These interpretations that follow directly from 
linear programming theory, can serve as a test of the practical viability of the relative 
weight restrictions. For some of the variables in question, the substitution assumptions 
are at least questionable. 
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Thus, when it comes to the choice between different types of weight restrictions, i.e. 
absolute, relative or virtual, we recommend, as in Report 1, to pursue virtual weight 
restrictions on geography variables (maximum weight)  and / or energy and customer 
variables (minimum weight). The proposed restrictions are formulated with respect to 
groups of variables rather than individual variables, thereby eliminating the need for 
detailed assumptions with respect to individual variables. In this report we give another 
justification for why maximum / minimum bounds of approximately 40 / 20, respectively, 
may be reasonable limits.  
There are, however, other methods that could be used instead of weight restrictions, for 
instance multistage DEA. Thus, we show a two-stage DEA model, where the first stage 
consists of solving a DEA model without geography variables, and the second stage 
consists of regressing the efficiency results on the geography variables, using the 
regression results to adjust efficiency scores. Although in the two-stage DEA model, it is 
not necessary to specify any cost based bounds, there are still many implementation 
details that will influence the results. We show that the results from two-stage model are 
similar to those of the 40 / 20 max and min virtual weight restrictions, but that more 
companies are affected, and that efficiency scores can either increase or decrease. 
Finally, we compare the results from the 40 / 20 virtual restrictions, as well as the results 
from the two-stage DEA procedure, to the method used by NVE to adjust the super 
efficiency scores. If the objective is to avoid very high efficiency scores, it is not obvious 
which of the three methods should be preferred. However, it  can be argued that the 
alternative methods (i.e., the weight restricted DEA model or two-stage DEA) have better 
incentive properties than the NVE method for adjusting super efficiencies, since they do 
not put any explicit restrictions on the companies’ measured super efficiencies. 
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1 Introduction 
This is the second of two reports on possible weight restrictions in the DEA 
benchmarking model for Norwegian electricity distribution companies. It follows 
Bjørndal, Bjørndal and Camanho (2008), hereafter referred to as Report 1. In the first 
report we documented the need for weight restrictions by discussing the unrestricted 
weights, as illustrated by Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 below. Table 1.1 shows the absolute 
values1 of the output weights (shadow prices) for 2005 and 2006, and Figure 1.1 
illustrates the virtual weights for 2006. These weights were discussed in Section 2.3 of 
Report 1, where we commented on the large variation in absolute weights, as well as 
unreasonable virtual weights for many companies. By “unreasonable” we mean that 
many companies have very high virtual weights for the geography variables, and/or very 
low weights for the energy/customer variables. We also showed that unreasonable 
weights are often accompanied by very high efficiency scores, indicating that weight 
restrictions may be appropriate. 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Energy 21 32 93 92 68 48
Customers 605 510 2 343 2 671 73 82
Cottage customers 1 531 1 165 7 848 7 264 67 69
HV-lines 4 864 8 735 32 457 44 683 88 63
Network stations 15 979 12 896 45 769 52 548 50 59
Interface 1 174 1 300 7 032 7 701 69 51
Forest 29 284 28 184 222 056 215 491 44 57
Snow 18 445 24 193 109 824 123 595 73 58
Coast 22 847 22 700 148 469 165 919 82 81
Average (NOK) Max (NOK) No. of zeros
 
Table 1.1: Output weights (shadow prices) for 2005 and 2006. 
                                                 
1 Note that the geography variables have been rescaled according to our proposal in Section 4.2 in Report 1. 
The rescaling operation affects the shadow prices of the rescaled variables, but leaves other shadow prices 
unchanged. 
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Figure 1.1: Virtual output weights for 2006. 
In Report 1 we gave an overview of the various types of restrictions that are available 
(relative, absolute and virtual), and we evaluated the relative restrictions (VR9-VR11), 
with respect to the geography variables, that were proposed in NVE (2008). As an 
alternative to the relative restrictions we proposed virtual weight restrictions with respect 
to the aggregate share of, e.g., the geography variables. The main argument behind our 
alternative approach is that it requires less detailed knowledge about the companies’ cost 
structure than the restrictions given in NVE (2008). If an output represents “more than 
itself”, for instance by being a “proxy” measure on one or more cost drivers, or if it 
represents other correlated factors that are not included in the model, it is almost 
impossible to determine the effect of this particular output on the total cost of a company, 
and it therefore becomes difficult to determine reasonable cost ratios that can be used as a 
basis for relative (pair wise) weight restrictions. By focusing on groups of variables, we 
reduce the need for such detailed cost information.   
In Report 2 we look at restrictions with respect to the remaining output variables in the 
model. We discuss the remaining restrictions VR1-VR8 proposed by NVE (2008), and 
we look at some alternatives. The structure of the report is as follows. In Section 2 we 
discuss the relative restrictions VR1-VR8 proposed by NVE (2008), and in Section 3 we 
present an alternative proposal based on the analysis and discussion from Report 1. In 
Section 4 we discuss alternative approaches for handling the geography effects, and we 
present an example of a two-stage DEA model. Section 5 compares the proposals from 
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Sections 3 and 4 to the NVE methods for super efficiency adjustment and efficiency 
score calibration. 
2 Evaluation of weight restrictions proposed by NVE 
Table 2.1 describes the weight restrictions proposed in NVE (2008). The overall 
motivation for the restrictions was discussed in Section 4 of Report 1, and the restrictions 
(VR9-VR11) with respect to the geography variables were also discussed there. In the 
following we consider the remaining restrictions VR1-VR8. 
Restriction(s) Involved variables Mathematical formulation 
VR1 / VR2 HV lines versus network stations NSHVNS ppp 572.8952.0 ≤≤  
VR3 / VR4 Interface versus network stations NSIntNS ppp 20738.002304.0 ≤≤
VR5 / VR6 Customers versus cottage customers CustCCustCust ppp 33/1 ≤≤  
VR7 / VR8 Network stations versus customers CustNSCust ppp 252.58618.1 ≤≤  
VR9 Forest versus HV lines HVForest pp 04.0≤  
VR10 Snow versus HV lines HVSnow pp 0053.0≤  
VR11 Coast versus HV lines HVCoast pp 364.36≤  
Table 2.1: Weight restrictions in NVE (2008)2 
2.1 Assumptions behind VR1-VR8 
The limits in VR1 and VR2 are based on the ratio between investment expenses for HV 
lines and network stations, respectively. The “normal” investment expense is estimated at 
419 000 NOK per kilometer of HV line, and 146 640 NOK per network station. NVE 
(2008) arrives at the ratio 419/146.64 = 2.8573 by implicitly assuming that lines and 
network stations have the same life span. The lower and upper bounds shown in Table 
2.1 are obtained by allowing the ratio between the prices of high voltage lines and 
network stations to vary between 1/3 and 3 times this number.  
                                                 
2 See NVE (2008) for a more detailed description of the assumptions. 
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Restrictions VR3 and VR4 are based on similar reasoning. Since the interface variable is 
expressed in terms of the annual cost3 and the network station variable is expressed in 
terms of the number of network stations, we need to transform one of them in order to 
make comparisons. NVE (2008) chooses to compute the annual capital cost of a network 
station by assuming a life span of 35 years and an interest rate of 5.6 %, and by assuming 
that the operating costs are 50 % of the capital cost. By using an annuity formula, we get 
an annual cost of 14 446 NOK per network station, and the appropriate cost ratio is 
therefore 1 / 14.446. Again, lower and upper bounds are obtained by allowing the price 
ratio to vary between 1/3 and 3 times this number.  
Restrictions VR5 and VR6 are based on the initial hypothesis that the marginal cost of an 
ordinary customer and a cottage customer are identical. NVE (2008) finds support for this 
hypothesis by comparing the average shadow prices of the two outputs. They therefore 
propose that the ratio between the corresponding shadow prices should be allowed to 
vary in the interval between 1/3 and 3. Note that the average unrestricted shadow prices 
in Table 1.1 indicate that the marginal cost of a cottage customer is more than twice as 
large as the marginal cost of an ordinary customer, contrary to the observation in NVE 
(2008). However, even if we accept the observed shadow prices in Table 1.1, we cannot 
conclude that cottage customers are more expensive than ordinary customers, since the 
two types of customers are structurally different. Cottage customers typically consume 
less energy than ordinary customers. We also know that the customer variables and the 
energy variable are highly correlated. Lower energy consumption will therefore cause 
some of the costs that, for ordinary customers, would be picked up by the energy 
variable, to be explained by the customer variable in the case of cottages. Thus, even if a 
cottage customer costs the same as an ordinary customer, we would expect the shadow 
price for cottage customers to be at least as high as for ordinary customers. 
Finally, restrictions VR7 and VR8 are based on the computed cost of 14 446 NOK per 
network station, as well as an estimate of the cost per customer. The estimated cost per 
customer is based on an estimate of the annual operating and capital cost of low voltage 
lines, as well as the number of meters of low voltage lines per customer. By using these 
estimates, NVE arrive at an annual cost, related to the low voltage network, of 
1 110 NOK per customer. The direct customer costs (metering, invoicing etc.) are 
estimated at 380 NOK, giving a total of 1 490 NOK per customer.  This gives a cost ratio 
                                                 
3 See NVE (2006a). The interface variable is given as a weighted sum of components located in the 
interface between the distribution network and other network levels, where the weights are estimates of 
annual capital and operating costs. 
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of 14.446 / 1.490 = 9.7087. The lower and upper limit in VR7 and VR8, respectively, 
correspond to 1/6 and 6 times this cost ratio. NVE (2008) argues that the variation in the 
number of network stations is very large among the companies; hence they conclude that 
a factor of 6 should be used to set the limits in this case, instead of the factor of 3 that was 
used in the case of VR1-VR6.  
2.2 How the optimal weights are affected by the restrictions 
As seen from Table 1.1, many of the unrestricted weights are equal to zero, implying that 
the corresponding output variable is not considered when evaluating the efficiency of the 
company in question. The introduction of weight restrictions forces most of the weights 
to take positive values, as illustrated in Table 2.2 below. We see that many of the 
variables have positive weights for all the 127 companies in our dataset. Note that this is 
the case for all the variables that are included in one or more of the two-sided restrictions, 
i.e., all the variables except energy and the geography variables.  
Variable Before After 
Energy delivered 79 88 
Customers 45 127 
Cottage customers 58 127 
HV lines 64 127 
Network stations 68 127 
Interface 76 127 
Forest 70 78 
Snow 69 65 
Coast 46 45 
Table 2.2: Number of companies with positive output weights before and after the introduction of weight 
restrictions, 2006 dataset. 
Table 2.3 provides more insight into how the restricted weights are actually determined. 
For all the two-sided restrictions we see that a majority of the companies have optimal 
weights that are either at the lower or upper bound. For example, the weight on cottage 
customers is restricted to the interval between 1/3 and 3 times the weight on ordinary 
customers. The table shows that the weight is at the lower bound for 72 companies, while 
it is at the upper bound for 33 companies. So there are 105 companies where either the 
lower or upper bound is binding. This phenomenon is not surprising, since the weights 
correspond to an optimal solution of an LP problem, and we know that LP problems will 
have optimal solutions at corner points of the feasible set.  
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Restriction(s) Mathematical formulation Lower binding
Upper 
binding Sum 
VR1 / VR2 NSHVNS ppp 572.8952.0 ≤≤  45 33 78 
VR3 / VR4 NSIntNS ppp 20738.002304.0 ≤≤ 56 39 95 
VR5 / VR6 CustCCustCust ppp 33/1 ≤≤  72 33 105 
VR7 / VR8 CustNSCust ppp 252.58618.1 ≤≤  13 51 64 
VR9 HVForest pp 04.0≤  - 28 28 
VR10 HVSnow pp 0053.0≤  - 31 31 
VR11 HVCoast pp 364.36≤  - 34 34 
Table 2.3: Binding weight restrictions, 2006 dataset. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the various restrictions form a system that links the weights. 
Each node in the figure corresponds to an output variable, and the arrows correspond to 
weight restrictions. The direction of each arrow shows the direction of the corresponding 
restriction. For example, VR1 specifies a lower bound for the HV weight relative to the 
weight on network stations, and this is illustrated by an arrow from the HV-line node to 
the network station node. We see that all the variables are included in one or more weight 
restrictions, except the energy variable. We have also included the number of binding 
restrictions in the figure, i.e., the numbers from Table 2.3. The numbers suggest that 
some combinations of binding restrictions are more common than others. Specifically, 
there is a tendency for the network station weight to form a lower bound for the weights 
of the “surrounding” variables, i.e., HV lines, interface and customers. Also, we see that 
the weight on ordinary customers tend to form a lower bound for the cottage customer 
weight. In fact, the restrictions VR8 and VR5 are binding for 41 companies. So for about 
one third of the companies three of the output weights are determined by the simple 
equations CustNS pp 252.58=  and CCustCust pp =3/1 . 
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Figure 2.1: System of relative weight restrictions. 
The histogram in Figure 2.2 further illustrates the extent to which the weight restrictions 
will be binding. With 4 two-sided restrictions and 3 one-sided restrictions, a maximum of 
7 restrictions can be binding for a particular company, although this does not occur for 
any company in the dataset. The figure shows that there are two companies with 6 
binding restrictions. Since each restriction links two weights, these two companies will 
have the relative values of 7 out of 9 output weights determined by an equation system 
consisting of the binding weight restrictions. A less extreme example is that 59 
companies have at least 4 binding restrictions. This means that almost one half of the 
companies in the dataset have at least 5 out of 9 output weights determined by the 
binding weight restrictions. 
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Figure 2.2: Binding weight restrictions, 2006 dataset. 
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The discussion in this section shows that the weight restrictions are not as innocent as 
they may seem, since they in practice to a large extent will be binding, and will determine 
the resulting weights. It is therefore very important that the underlying assumptions are 
well founded, and based on a good understanding of the output weights. In the next 
section we will show that this may represent a formidable challenge, given the properties 
of the present DEA model. 
2.3 Weight restrictions on approximate cost drivers 
The short presentation of VR1-VR8 in Section 2.1 shows that the restrictions are based 
on a number of more or less explicit assumptions. These assumptions can be determined 
by answering the following questions: 
1) Which cost elements should be included when cost ratios are calculated, i.e., 
which cost elements are relevant for the output variables in question? Is it, for 
instance, relevant to use the cost of high voltage lines to represent the effect of the 
HV-variable, or should we also include other cost elements, e.g. part of the cost of 
low voltage lines? 
2) What are the correct assumptions when converting investment expenses into 
annual capital costs, i.e., the relevant cost of capital and the equipment life 
span(s)? An example is the implicit assumption underlying VR1/VR2, namely 
that high voltage lines and network stations have the same life span. 
3) How wide should the intervals be? In NVE (2008) a factor of 3 has been used, 
except in the case of VR7/VR8, where a factor of 6 was assumed. 
It is very difficult to answer these questions, and in particular question 1. Some of the 
“input” variables on the output side, like HV lines and network stations, are included as 
proxies for factors that are difficult to measure, such as demographical and topological 
factors. Thus, we cannot necessarily compare the shadow price of one kilometer of HV 
lines to the observed cost of installing and operating the line, since this particular output 
may represent “more than itself”.  
Even though we have a candidate variable that can be used to represent a particular 
output factor, the variable might be omitted from the model, and the cost effect of that 
variable will therefore be picked up by one or more of the included output variables. This 
is due to the way that the DEA model was constructed in the first place. As described in 
NVE (2006a/b), statistical tests were used to check whether variables should be included 
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in the model or not. Some cost drivers were excluded, either because they did not pass the 
statistical tests, or for other reasons. One example was low voltage lines, which was 
excluded, while the high voltage line variable was included. Table 2.4 below shows some 
examples of the so-called Banker test4 for these two variables. The Banker test was used 
to determine whether new output variables had a significant effect on the average 
efficiency score for the companies in the dataset. The second last column in Table 2.4 
shows the t-ratio for the observed effect of adding the variable in question, and the last 
column shows the probability that the observed effect would happen accidentally. It is 
common to conclude that an observed effect is non-significant if the probability value is 
larger than 0.05. Based on this assumption, we see that the LV variable has a significant 
effect if it is added to a model where only the customer and energy variable is included 
initially, but the effect is non-significant if the variable is added to a model where also the 
HV variable is included. This is not surprising, since the LV and HV variables are highly 
correlated5.  
Already included variablesNew variable Cust. Energy HV LV t p(T > t) 
LV x x   8.7 0.00 
LV x x x  1.4 0.08 
HV x x   17.3 0.00 
HV x x  x 9.4 0.00 
Table 2.4: Test statistics for HV lines and LV lines, pooled dataset for 2001-2004. 
NVE (2006a/b) finally concluded that the LV variable should be dropped from the model, 
and the final decision was based on the results of the statistical tests6 as well as the 
perceived low data quality of the LV variable. Since there is no doubt that LV lines 
represent a major cost driver for distribution companies, and because the LV and HV 
variables are highly correlated, we would expect part of the cost of low voltage lines to 
be picked up by the HV variable. However, since the LV variable is also highly 
correlated with other included variables, e.g. the network station variable7, it is 
impossible to specify how the LV cost effect is distributed among the included cost 
drivers.   
                                                 
4 See Banker & Natarajan (2004) and Kittelsen (1993). 
5 The correlation coefficient value is 0.96 for the 2001-2004 dataset. 
6 In NVE (2006a) the LV variable was only tested against a model that already included the HV variable. 
Table 2.4 shows that the HV variable would have a statistically significant effect even if it was added to a 
model that already contained the LV variable. This implies that arguments purely based on statistical tests 
could have lead to a different outcome had the order of the tests in NVE (2006a) been reversed. 
7 The correlation coefficient value is 0.97 for the 2001-2004 dataset. 
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The above discussion tells us that we should be very careful to interpret individual 
shadow prices, since we do not know what kind of cost effects they are explaining. This 
is our main reason for not recommending weight restrictions at a very detailed level, as 
given by VR1-VR11. We instead suggested that weight restrictions should be specified at 
a more aggregate level, i.e., with respect to groups of variables rather than for individual 
variables. We already discussed this in Report 1, and will repeat our suggestions in 
Section 3 below. 
2.4 Implicit assumption - substitution possibilities 
Weight restrictions can be given a mathematical interpretation in terms of the LP 
problems that are solved when computing the efficiency scores. Without weight 
restrictions the LP problem for company j* is the following: 
(LP1)  ∑
≠ *
Min
jj
jj xλλ    
s.t.   
*
*
rj
jj
rjj yy ≥∑
≠
λ   r = 1,...,s    
0≥jλ    j = 1,...,n   
There are n companies producing s different outputs. The total cost of company j is xj 
while company j produces yrj units of output r. The variable λj is the weight of company j 
in the reference set of the evaluated company j*. The model is CRS (with constant returns 
to scale, λj ≥ 0) and we assume super efficiency (sum over j except j*). The interpretation 
of the linear program is that in the performance evaluation of company j* we find the 
reference company, as a linear combination of the other companies in the industry, with 
minimum cost, such that it produces at least as much of each output as the evaluated 
company. Alternatively, we may formulate the dual problem of LP1: 
(LP2)  ∑
r
rjrjp
py **Max    
s.t 
j
r
rjrj xpy ≤∑ *   j ≠ j*    
0* ≥rjp    
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The decision variables are the prices prj* for each output of the evaluated company, and 
the linear program can be interpreted so as to find prices for company j* that maximize 
revenue, and at the same time assure that none of the other companies, as represented by 
their respective output vectors, exceed their total cost at these prices (they are within a 
budget limit). The prices prj* in problem LP2 are the shadow prices of the output 
constraints in LP1, and consequently, prj* gives the increase in minimum cost due to an 
increase in yrj*, and is a local per unit cost of output r. 
As an example, the weight restrictions VR1 and VR2 will result in the following extra 
constraints (rows) in LP1:  
0952.0 ** ,, ≤+− jNSjHV pp      (VR1) 
0572.8 ** ,, ≤− jNSjHV pp     (VR2)  
Since each row in the dual corresponds to a column in the primal, the primal (LP1) will be 
extended with two extra columns (decision variables), UP NSHV ,γ  and LO NSHV ,γ , and these 
variables will only appear in the output constraints for HV and NS: 
*
*
,,,, jHV
UP
NSHV
LO
NSHV
jj
jHVj yy ≥+−∑
≠
γγλ  (HV) 
*
*
,,,, 572.8952.0 jNS
UP
NSHV
LO
NSHV
jj
jNSj yy ≥−+∑
≠
γγλ  (NS) 
The decision variable LO NSHV ,γ  will only be allowed to take nonzero values if the lower 
price limit VR1 is binding8. In this case, company j* will be allowed to “convert” HV 
lines into network stations in order to cover the output requirement for network stations. 
For every kilometer of HV line that the company gives up, it will gain 0.952 network 
stations. On the other hand, if the upper price limit VR2 is binding, the decision variable 
UP
NSHV ,γ  will be allowed to take nonzero values. In this case, company j* will be allowed to 
“convert” network stations into HV lines in order to cover the output requirement for HV 
lines. For every kilometer of extra HV lines that the company adds, it will be forced to 
give up 8.572 network stations.  
The interpretation of weight restrictions as extra substitution possibilities provides an 
additional test of whether the restrictions are reasonable or not. In the case of “similar” 
output variables like HV lines and network stations this may be reasonable. In other cases 
                                                 
8 This follows from the complementary slack conditions. 
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where the respective outputs represent very different kinds of objects, like network 
stations and customers, such implicit substitution assumptions may be more questionable.   
3 Alternative weight restrictions 
The main conclusion from Section 2 is that, since output variables may represent “more 
than themselves”, it is very difficult to interpret their shadow prices, and this makes it 
difficult to specify the detailed assumptions that are needed in order to formulate 
restrictions like VR1-VR8. The remaining restrictions VR9-VR11 were discussed in 
detail in Report 1, and we proposed a reformulation of the restrictions as well as the 
geography variables. However, the question of how to determine appropriate limits is no 
less difficult for these restrictions, and we will therefore not use them as part of our 
proposal. Instead we recommend the use of virtual weight restrictions formulated with 
respect to groups of variables rather than individual variables, thereby reducing the need 
for detailed cost information. 
3.1 Virtual weight restrictions 
The virtual output associated with an output variable is defined as the product of its 
optimal shadow price pr and the physical output quantity *rjy , where j
* is the company 
that is being evaluated . Thus, virtual output can be interpreted as the “revenue” that 
company j* can collect from output r, and if we sum all the virtual outputs we get the 
DEA cost norm (in NOK) for the evaluated company. Virtual weight restrictions are 
restrictions with respect to the absolute or relative “revenue” coming from one or more of 
the outputs.  
It was documented in Report 1 that companies with very high efficiency scores also tend 
to weight the geography variables quite heavily. We therefore proposed, in Report 1, an 
upper bound on the relative virtual weight of these variables, given by: 
α≤⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅
∑r rjr
jCoastCoastjSnowSnowjForestForest
yp
ypypyp
*
*** ,,,    (1) 
The number α has a value between 0 and 1, and represents the maximal share of the total 
cost norm (for the evaluated company *j ) that the geography variables may account for. 
We also proposed a lower bound for the virtual weight of the “essential” variables, 
namely energy delivered and customers: 
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β≥⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅
∑r rjr
jCCustCCustjCustCustjEnergyEnergy
yp
ypypyp
*
*** ,,,   (2) 
The number β has a value between 0 and 1, and represents the minimal share of the total 
cost norm that the product variables may account for.  
Restrictions (1) and (2) were discussed in detail in Report 1, and compared to a revised 
version of the relative restrictions VR9-VR11. We showed that the relative restrictions 
tend to affect a large number of companies, but the effect can be quite small for many 
companies. The virtual (group) restrictions, on the other hand, target companies with very 
high unrestricted efficiency scores, while leaving most other companies with very small 
or no changes in their efficiency scores. 
Determination of the limits 
In order to implement the virtual weight restrictions, we need to determine reasonable 
values for the upper and lower limits, i.e., α and β. This issue was also discussed in 
Report 1, and Table 3.1 below is related to Figure 6.8 in Report 1. We show efficiency 
scores from a model where the geography variables have been omitted, and the 
companies have been sorted according to a simple “geography index”9, where high index 
values indicate difficult geographic conditions. We see that the cost weighted average 
efficiency of the entire industry in 2007 was 85.1 %, indicating that the total cost of the 
industry can be reduced by 14.9 %. Note that this inefficiency can be caused by either 
bad management or external factors. Suppose that we give the companies the benefit of 
the doubt and assume that all of their inefficiency is caused by external factors, i.e., that 
all the inefficiency is caused by the geography factors. Hence, the geography factors 
cannot account for more than 14.9 % of the industry cost norm. Note that the effect can 
be much larger than this for individual companies, and restriction (1) needs to allow for 
this. For example, the company (Austevoll) with the highest index value had an 
efficiency score of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the geography cost share can be at most 
52 %. Since there is some uncertainty with respect to the correctness of the DEA 
analysis, we should not base our estimate on data for only one (extreme) company, and 
we may e.g. use the average inefficiency score for the companies corresponding to the  5 
highest index values, giving us an upper bound for the geography share of 37.7 % 
                                                 
9 The index is constructed by reformulating the geography variables as described in Section 4.2 in Report 1, 
and then dividing the variables by the number of kilometers of HV lines. The resulting index numbers can 
be interpreted as the share of a company’s network that is made up of “difficult” lines.  
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(100 % - 62.3 %). If we base the limit on the 10 companies with highest index values, we 
get a limit of 32.1 %. We choose a limit that is high enough to accommodate the 5 first 
companies in both years, and in our recommendation the upper limit for the geography 
share will be set equal to 40 %. This value is also consistent with the sensititivity analysis 
in Figure 5.4 in Report 1, where we concluded that a limit of 20-40 % will result in zero 
correlation between the geography variables and the efficiency scores. 
Companies 2006 2007 
Highest: Austevoll 48.9 % 48.0 % 
5 highest: Austevoll, Tysnes, Nesset, Trollfjord, Rødøy-Lurøy 66.2 % 62.3 % 
10 highest: Austevoll, Tysnes, Nesset, Trollfjord, Rødøy-Lurøy, Modalen, 
Stryn, Sunndal, Ørskog, Fusa (2006) / Stranda (2007) 
73.6 % 67.9 % 
20 highest 74.5 % 70.2 % 
50 highest 77.4 % 75.1 % 
All companies 89.8 % 85.1 % 
Table 3.1: Cost weighted average efficiency scores from a DEA model without geography variables, where 
the companies have been sorted according to a “geography index”. 
With respect to the lower limit for the energy / customer weights, this could be 
determined by looking at the cost structure of the companies, as in Table 3.2 below. We 
have estimated the cost shares for power losses and direct customer costs, respectively. 
The direct customer costs have been obtained from Note 6 (OpEx), and Note 17.400 and 
17.410 (CapEx)10. Power losses are valued at area prices from NordPool spot that lie in 
the range 234-238 NOK per MWh. The companies have been sorted according to the 
combined share of energy/customer related costs. We see that the cost share for the entire 
dataset is 22.7 %, but that there are large variations for individual companies. For 
example, the 10 companies with lowest cost shares have an average cost share of only 
14.1 %. Note that the cost shares are quite sensitive to the area prices used to compute the 
costs of power losses. Since the area prices were quite low in 2007, the cost shares 
reported in the table probably represents a low estimate. Considering that some of the 
“other” costs should also be related to energy / customers, a lower bound of 20 % for 
energy / customers seems reasonable. 
                                                 
10 There were 138 in the dataset, and we have removed 31 of these. We removed companies with no 
reported customers, no reported capital / depreciation for the customer-related activities, or extreme values 
with respect to the direct customer cost per customer. The remaining 107 companies correspond to 88 % of 
the industry cost (including network-related costs). 
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No. of 
companies 
Costs of 
power losses 
Direct customer 
costs 
Total energy / 
customer related costs Other costs 
10 6.2 % 7.9 % 14.1 % 85.9 % 
20 5.9 % 8.7 % 14.7 % 85.3 % 
30 6.7 % 8.8 % 15.5 % 84.5 % 
50 7.2 % 9.9 % 17.1 % 82.9 % 
107 9.2 % 13.4 % 22.7 % 77.3 % 
Table 3.2: Cumulative share of costs related to energy/customer (2007). 
Consequences of the proposed restrictions 
The consequences of the proposed restrictions are illustrated in Figure 3.1 (2006) and 
Figure 3.2 (2007), as well as parts of Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The results are as expected 
from the analysis in Report 1, i.e., the restrictions have large effects for companies with 
high unrestricted efficiency scores, while the other companies are not affected to a large 
extent. This differs from the relative weight restrictions that we analyzed in Report 1 (i.e., 
the revised versions of VR9-VR11), where we saw considerable effects for a large 
number of companies.  
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Figure 3.1: Effect of virtual restrictions with respect to geography and energy/customers (2006). Names 
indicate companies with a reduction of more than 5 %-points. 
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Figure 3.2: Effect of virtual restrictions with respect to geography and energy/customers (2007). Names 
indicate companies with a reduction of more than 5 %-points. 
Model 2006 2007 
Unrestricted model 93.6 % 89.1 %
40 / 20 virtual restriction 93.2 % 88.5 %
40 / 20 & customer restrictions 91.5 % 87.6 %
Table 3.3: Cost weighted average efficiency scores for the  
weight restrictions considered in Sections 3.1 (first two lines) and .3.2 (last line). 
40 / 20 virtual restriction 40 / 20 & customer restrictions Reduction in %-
points 2006 2007 2006 2007 
Over 50 0 0 0 0 
25 - 50 4 3 4 3 
10 - 25 2 5 2 5 
 5 - 10 2 3 10 6 
 0 -   5 43 39 98 100 
No change 76 78 13 14 
Table 3.4: Efficiency score reductions caused by the restrictions for the weight restrictions considered in 
Sections 3.1 (first two columns) and 3.2 (two last columns). 
SNF Report No. 22/09 
 19 
3.2 Restrictions on the customer weights 
We consider the following restrictions with respect to the two customer variables: 
1)  A lower absolute bound for both variables. The direct customer costs for the 107 
companies that we have analyzed in Table 3.2 have average direct customer costs 
of 503 NOK per customer. We argue that the shadow price for both of the 
customer variables should at least cover the direct cost, and therefore set a lower 
bound of 500 NOK for both the customer weights. 
2) A relative restriction stating that the weight on the cottage customer variable 
should be at least as high as the weight on the customer variable. This reflects the 
motivation for including the cottage customer variable in the first place. I.e., that 
companies with a large share of cottage customers need to be allowed to weight 
these customers more heavily than other customers, since they consume less 
energy. The included restriction allows for this to take place, while weight 
schemes where pCust > pCCust will not be allowed. 
The above restrictions can be summarized as: 
 pCCust ≥ pCust ≥ 500      (3) 
The effects of these restrictions are illustrated in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 below. We 
have analyzed the effect of adding the customer restrictions to the virtual restrictions for 
geography and energy / customers. We see that the additional effects are quite small, 
although a large number of companies are affected, as can also be seen from Table 3.4 
above. 
SNF Report No. 22/09 
 20 
50 %
70 %
90 %
110 %
130 %
150 %
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
sc
or
e
Companies
40 / 20 & customer restrictions 40 / 20 virtual restrictions
 
Figure 3.3: Additional effect of restrictions on customer weights (2006). 
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Figure 3.4: Additional effect of restrictions on customer weights (2007). 
4 Alternative approaches to the geography effects 
One of the main arguments for considering weight restrictions, as stated by NVE (2008), 
is to limit the effect of the geography variables on the efficiency measurement. An 
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alternative to weight restrictions is to look at the way that these variables are incorporated 
in the DEA efficiency analysis. As the DEA model is now, the geography variables are 
treated in the same manner as “ordinary” output variables. In the DEA literature several 
approaches to the consideration of environmental effects have been considered. These 
approaches can be categorized in the following manner (see Coelli et al., 2005): 
1) Methods by which the companies (DMUs) are grouped into categories, and where 
a particular company is evaluated against a dataset consisting of companies with a 
less favorable environment than itself. For details, see Cooper et al. (2007). 
2) Methods by which the environmental (geography) variables are used directly in 
the estimation of the efficiency scores, either as input / output variables in the 
DEA model, or they are used to adjust the initial efficiency scores. We distinguish 
between the following types of models11: 
a) One-stage models, where the environmental variables are included directly 
in the DEA model as either input or output variables. The approach used 
by NVE so far falls into this category. 
b) Two-stage DEA models, where the first stage consists of running a DEA 
analysis without the environmental variables, and where these variables 
are used as explanatory variables in (e.g.) a regression analysis in the 
second stage.  See Ray (1991) for a good introduction, whereas Barnum & 
Gleason (2008) discuss an important bias problem that may arise with this 
method. 
c) Other multi-stage approaches. An example is given in Ruggiero (2004), 
where a third stage is added to a two-stage model, and where the third 
stage consists of running a new DEA analysis with an environmental 
(geography) index obtained from the regression analysis in the second 
stage. Other three- or four-stage approaches are discussed and compared 
in Cordero et al. (2009)12 and Ruggiero (2004). 
In the following we will compare the effect of the virtual restrictions on the geography 
variables and energy / customer variables, to the results from a two-stage DEA 
procedure. We have used the same approach as in Ray (1991), i.e.: 
                                                 
11 A good overview of the different approaches can be found in Ruggiero (2004) and Cordero et al. (2009). 
12 See also Estelle et al. (2010) for some critical comments to this article. 
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Stage 1: A DEA analysis without the geography variables, i.e., with 6 output 
variables, is performed. 
Stage 2: The (super) efficiency scores from the Stage 1 are used as the dependent 
variable in a linear regression analysis, where the geography variables13 are used 
as explanatory variables. As in Ray (1991) we have used adjusted14 residuals from 
the regression analysis as estimates of managerial inefficiency, i.e., inefficiency 
that is not caused by external factors. Then we compute the efficiency score of 
each company as 1 minus the inefficiency score. 
The results from the two-stage procedure are compared to the results from the one-stage 
model in Figure 4.1. In order to make the results comparable, the efficiency scores have 
been calibrated15 such that the cost weighted average is equal to 100 %. The figure shows 
that the two methods are similar in that they give large reductions in efficiency scores for 
companies that appear as highly super efficient in the unrestricted DEA analysis. 
However, switching to a two-stage DEA model will have positive or negative effects also 
for inefficient companies. Table 4.1 shows that the two-stage DEA approach results in 
efficiency score increases of more than 2 %-points for 51 companies. The introduction of 
(virtual) weight restrictions can only lead to lower efficiency scores, although the 
calibration causes the large decreases for some companies to be offset by a small increase 
for the rest of the companies.  
Change
 (%-points)
40 / 20 virtual 
restrictions
Two-stage 
DEA
> +2 0 51
-2 to +2 110 42
-10 to -2 10 26
-20 to -10 4 5
< -20 4 4
Sum 128 128  
Table 4.1: Changes in calibrated efficiency scores, relative to unrestricted DEA (2007). 
                                                 
13 Each geography variable in the regression analysis is given by its index value, i.e., a number between 0 
and 1, multiplied by the share of overhead high voltage lines for the respective companies. Cf. the 
reformulation described in Section 4.2 of Report 1. 
14 The adjustment in Ray (1991) consists of adding the largest residual to the intercept term in the 
regression model, such that all the (adjusted) residuals become non-positive. 
15 We have used the same calibration method that NVE applied when computing the revenue caps for 2008 
and 2009, i.e., we have added a constant to all the efficiency scores. See Bjørndal & Bjørndal (2006b) and 
Bjørndal et al. (2008b) for a discussion of the various calibration methods that have been used. 
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Figure 4.1: Virtual weight restrictions versus two-stage DEA (2007). 
The next two tables focus on the companies for which the efficiency reductions are 
particularly large. Table 4.2 shows the companies with the largest efficiency score 
reductions if the virtual restrictions were adopted, and Table 4.3 shows similar results for 
the two-stage procedure. We see that the methods produce similar results relative to the 
unrestricted efficiency scores, i.e., they agree to a large extent on which companies 
should have the largest reductions. However, there are some exceptions, e.g. Drangedal 
and Austevoll in Table 4.2, and Krødsherad and Rauland in Table 4.3. These exceptions 
should be studied further, in order to find out why the two methods yield different results.  
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Increase / decrease 
Company 
Unrestricted 
efficiency 
score 
40 / 20 
restriction 
2-stage 
DEA 
Tysnes Kraftlag PL 127.6 % -47.5 -43.4 
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 137.7 % -40.5 -42.7 
Nesset Kraft AS 147.1 % -34.5 -39.2 
Fusa Kraftlag 121.4 % -21.6 -22.2 
Trollfjord Kraft AS 133.7 % -12.1 -17.5 
Drangedal Everk KF 115.6 % -11.9 -5.4 
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 135.9 % -11.5 -14.8 
Austevoll Kraftlag BA 97.5 % -10.3 -5.7 
Table 4.2: Companies most affected (< -10) by introduction of 40 / 20 virtual restrictions (2007). 
Increase / decrease 
Company 
Unrestricted 
efficiency 
score 
40 / 20 
restriction 
2-stage 
DEA 
Tysnes Kraftlag PL 127.6 % -47.5 -43.4 
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 137.7 % -40.5 -42.7 
Nesset Kraft AS 147.1 % -34.5 -39.2 
Fusa Kraftlag 121.4 % -21.6 -22.2 
Trollfjord Kraft AS 133.7 % -12.1 -17.5 
Krødsherad Everk KF 158.6 % -1.4 -16.3 
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 135.9 % -11.5 -14.8 
Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 118.0 % -1.9 -14.3 
Modalen Kraftlag BA 106.1 % -8.6 -11.9 
Table 4.3: Companies most affected (< -10) by transition to two-stage DEA (2007). 
5 NVE methods for super efficiency adjustment and calibration 
Before computing the revenue caps, NVE makes the following adjustments of the 
efficiency results: 
1) The quality costs (VOLL) in the DEA analysis are represented by average 
reported costs over the previous years. The efficiency results are adjusted for the 
difference between actual VOLL (in year t – 2) and average VOLL.   
2) In order to prevent unreasonably high efficiency scores as a result of outliers in 
the dataset, super efficient companies are re-evaluated against a dataset from the 
year(s) preceding the year of the current dataset. The DEA model in the second 
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step includes data for the company itself, hence a company can only appear as 
super efficient if it has improved its performance relative to the previous year(s)16. 
3) The efficiency scores are calibrated such that the cost weighted average becomes 
equal to 100 %. For 2008 and 2009, this calibration has been done by adding a 
constant to the efficiency score of each company17. The constant is equal to the 
difference between 100 % and the cost weighted average of the uncalibrated 
efficiency scores. 
Adjustment 1) has very little effect for most companies, and we will therefore not 
consider it here, i.e., all the efficiency results presented below are unadjusted with respect 
to 1). Since weight restrictions are seen as an alternative method for limiting the super 
efficiency scores, it is interesting to compare the efficiency scores under weight 
restrictions to the adjusted super efficiencies computed by NVE. In order to make the two 
sets of efficiency scores comparable, we calibrate them using the method described in 3) 
above.  
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 illustrate the difference between the NVE adjusted efficiency 
scores and the efficiency scores under the virtual weight restrictions. We see that the 
effect of going from the NVE adjusted efficiency results to weight restricted DEA can be 
positive or negative. There are two companies, Krødsherad and Nord-Salten, that are 
highly super efficient in the unrestricted model, and for which the weight restrictions 
have little or no effect. If the NVE super efficiency adjustment, as explained in 2) above, 
was replaced by virtual weight restrictions, these two companies would experience an 
increase in the (calibrated) efficiency score of 32 and 30 percentage points, respectively. 
In order to understand why these companies are left with such high efficiency scores even 
after the weight restrictions are imposed, we may look at the virtual weights of the 
various outputs, as shown in Figure 5.2. We see that Krødsherad weights cottage 
customers and forest heavily, while Nord-Salten puts the majority of its weight on HV 
lines and the coast parameter. However, it is not obvious that the weights of the two 
                                                 
16 For 2007, the initial DEA analyses were based on data from 2005, and the re-evaluation in the second step was against a 
dataset from 2004. For 2008 and 2009, the re-evaluation dataset was created by taking averages of the datasets for the periods 
2004-2005 and 2004-2006, respectively. 
17 For 2007 the calibration was done by dividing the individual efficiency scores by the uncalibrated cost weighted average. 
NVE (2006a) also describes a third calibration method, whereby the revenue shortfall of the industry is distributed among the 
companies in proportion their capital book values. This calibration method is used after the revenue caps have been calculated, 
in order to make the total industry revenue equal to the total industry costs. For 2007-2009 this calibration effect has been 
negative, and it has in fact served to withdraw the so-called compensation parameter. See Bjørndal et al. (2008b) for a 
discussion of the different calibration alternatives. 
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companies are unreasonable; hence we cannot conclude that the high efficiency scores 
are not representative of their true performance. 
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Figure 5.1: NVE adjusted efficiency versus efficiency under virtual weight restrictions (2007). 
Company NVE adjusted efficiency 
DEA with 40 / 20 
virtual restrictions 
Increase / 
decrease 
Krødsherad Everk KF 125 % 157 % 32 
Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 114 % 144 % 30 
Ørskog Energi AS 114 % 129 % 15 
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 111 % 124 % 13 
Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 114 % 127 % 13 
Trollfjord Kraft AS 111 % 122 % 10 
Austevoll Kraftlag BA 98 % 87 % -11 
Fusa Kraftlag 111 % 100 % -12 
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 111 % 97 % -14 
Tysnes Kraftlag PL 111 % 80 % -31 
Table 5.1: NVE adjusted efficiency versus efficiency under virtual weight restrictions (2007). 
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Figure 5.2: Virtual weights after the introduction of 40 / 20 weight restrictions (2007). 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2 compare the results from the two-stage DEA procedure to the 
NVE adjusted results. We see that the two-stage DEA model yields efficiency results that 
are less similar to the NVE scheme than the weight restricted efficiency scores illustrated 
in Figure 5.1, since the former method causes changes for a large number of companies, 
while the latter method mostly affect the super efficient companies. For the super 
efficient companies the results from the two alternative methods are somewhat similar, as 
we noted in Section 4. Again Krødsherad and Nord-Salten stand out as the companies 
that get the largest increases in their efficiency scores, relative to the NVE efficiency 
scores. 
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Figure 5.3: NVE adjusted efficiency versus two-stage DEA (2007). 
Company NVE adjusted efficiency 
Two-stage 
DEA 
Increase / 
decrease 
Nord-Salten Kraftlag AL 114 % 149 % 35 
Krødsherad Everk KF 125 % 142 % 17 
Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 114 % 127 % 13 
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 111 % 121 % 10 
Rauland Kraftforsyningslag 115 % 104 % -12 
Nesset Kraft AS 120 % 108 % -12 
Fusa Kraftlag 111 % 99 % -12 
Modalen Kraftlag BA 107 % 94 % -12 
Lyse Nett AS 135 % 123 % -12 
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 111 % 95 % -16 
Tysnes Kraftlag PL 111 % 84 % -27 
Table 5.2: NVE adjusted efficiency versus two-stage DEA (2007). 
It is not possible to conclude from the above analysis which of the two methods (weight 
restrictions or two-stage DEA) is preferrable. Neither method yields super efficiency 
scores that are dramatically higher than the NVE method (with perhaps one or two 
exceptions). An important argument against the NVE method is its questionable incentive 
properties for efficient companies. Because of the way that NVE limits the super 
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efficiency scores, these companies will, over time, tend to be their own reference, hence 
they will have weak incentives for “real” efficiency improvement18. Neither of the 
alternative methods, if implemented as in this report, puts any explicit restrictions on 
super efficiency scores. Thus, it can be argued that they both have better incentive 
properties than the NVE method. 
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
We investigate NVE’s suggestions for relative weight restrictions on the structural and 
size dependent output variables, i.e. VR1-VR8 in NVE (2008). The two-sidedness of the 
weight restrictions and the large number of them, involving a large share of the output 
variables, may have unintended effects on the efficiency scores, and the effects on the 
efficiency scores are in many cases determined almost completely by the exact limits of 
the relative weight restrictions. The latter implies that the specification of the limits is 
very important. 
Since many of the output factors in question represent “more than themselves”, as 
discussed in Section 2.3, it may be extremely difficult to settle on meaningful bounds on 
relative shadow prices. In order to illustrate this point, we also discuss the implicit 
assumptions about substitutability between output variables that relative weight 
restrictions represent. These interpretations that follow directly from linear programming 
theory, can serve as a test of the practical viability of the relative weight restrictions. For 
some of the variables in question, the substitution assumptions are at least questionable. 
Thus, when it comes to the choice between different types of weight restrictions, i.e. 
absolute, relative or virtual, we recommend, as in Report 1, to pursue virtual weight 
restrictions on geography variables (maximum weight)  and / or energy and customer 
variables (minimum weight), thereby eliminating the need for the detailed assumptions 
with respect to individual variables that are required by VR1-VR11. In Section 3.1 we 
also give another justification for why maximum / minimum bounds of approximately 40 
/ 20, respectively, may be reasonable limits.  
There are, however, other methods that could be used instead of weight restrictions, for 
instance multistage DEA. As an example we look at a two-stage method in Section 4. 
Although in the two-stage DEA model, it is not necessary to specify any cost based 
bounds, there are still many implementation details that will influence the results. We 
                                                 
18 See Bjørndal & Bjørndal (2006b) for a discussion. 
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show that the results from two-stage model are similar to those of the 40 / 20 max and 
min virtual weight restrictions, but that more companies are affected, and that efficiency 
scores can either increase or decrease. 
Finally, in Section 5, we compare the (calibrated) efficiency results from the DEA model 
with weight restrictions and the two-stage DEA approach, to the NVE method of 
adjusting the super efficiency scores. If the objective is to avoid very high efficiency 
scores, it is not obvious which of the three methods should be preferred. It can be argued 
that the alternative methods (i.e., the weight restricted DEA model or two-stage DEA) 
have better incentive properties than the NVE method for adjusting super efficiencies, 
since they do no put any explicit restrictions on the companies’ measured super 
efficiencies. 
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